This chapter concludes the study. It summarizes the findings of the empirical chapters, and thus evaluates trends in congressional advocacy for policy change in international organizations. Each phase has been shown to be a product of both the domestic institutional procedures available and the international environment. As with previous episodes, the future will be determined by the structure of the international banking system to emerge from the 2008 crisis. The chapter then makes comparisons of congressional advocacy toward the IMF and World Bank with two other international organizations: the World Trade Organization and the United Nations. The most notable difference with the World Trade Organization is the lack of a budget lever similar to the IMF and World Bank. The most notable difference with the United Nations is that it does not have the same problem with committee jurisdiction in Congress that “orphans” the Bretton Woods institutions. Nonetheless, there are many similarities. The book concludes that legislation for the IMF and World Bank has succeeded despite formidable obstacles. While the separation of powers in the American Constitution has complicated US membership in international organizations, individual members of Congress have also championed them throughout their histories.
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