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Phenomenal Intentionality$
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Uriah Kriegel

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199764297

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764297.001.0001

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Unconscious Belief and Conscious Thought

Unconscious Belief and Conscious Thought

Chapter:
(p.156) 9 Unconscious Belief and Conscious Thought
Source:
Phenomenal Intentionality
Author(s):

Tim Crane

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764297.003.0009

Are conscious thoughts and sensations conscious in the same way? The chapter gives an affirmative answer to this question. The chapter argues first for two independent claims: first, that Block's notion of access consciousness must be understood in terms of phenomenal consciousness, and in this sense phenomenal consciousness is the more fundamental notion; and second, that beliefs are never phenomenally conscious, though episodes of thinking are. This provides us with the sense in which thoughts and experiences are conscious: they are both a certain kind of occurrence or episode, that the chapter calls an episode in the stream of consciousness. This provides the answer to the initial question: there is a single way of being conscious which thoughts and experiences exhibit.

Keywords:   access consciousness, phenomenal consciousness, the stream of consciousness, conscious thought, conscious belief, sensation

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