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Phenomenal Intentionality$
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Uriah Kriegel

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199764297

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764297.001.0001

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Constructing a World for the Senses

Constructing a World for the Senses

Chapter:
(p.99) 6 Constructing a World for the Senses
Source:
Phenomenal Intentionality
Author(s):

Katalin Farkas

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764297.003.0006

It is an integral part of the phenomenology of mature perceptual experience that it seems to present to us an experience-independent world. The chapter calls this feature ’perceptual intentionality’. The chapter argues that perceptual intentionality is constructed by the structure of more basic phenomenal sensory features, features that are not themselves intentional. This theory can explain why the same sensory feature can figure both in presentational and non-presentational experiences. There is a fundamental difference between the intentionality of sensory experiences and the intentionality of thoughts: unlike the former, the latter is not constructed from non-intentional phenomenal features of mental episodes.

Keywords:   perception, intentionality, phenomenal intentionality

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