Theories on which the intentional contents of conscious thoughts are constituted by a distinctive sort of cognitive phenomenology (by what it's like to have them) are prima facie committed to intrinsicalism about intentional content, according to which the content of a thought is determined by its intrinsic properties. Such theories are in conflict with an account of the content of indexical thoughts (thoughts whose expression involves the utterance of indexicals) that is a natural extension of the standard account of the semantics of sentences containing demonstratives or indexicals. This chapter argues that the intuitions supporting the standard semantics of indexicals, and their extension to the contents of indexical concepts, are not inevitable, and that there is a workable and intuitively satisfying alternative consistent with intrinsicalism about phenomenally constituted intentional content.
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