Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Phenomenal Intentionality$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Uriah Kriegel

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199764297

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764297.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 23 February 2020

Indexical Thought

Indexical Thought

Chapter:
(p.49) 3 Indexical Thought
Source:
Phenomenal Intentionality
Author(s):

David Pitt

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764297.003.0003

Theories on which the intentional contents of conscious thoughts are constituted by a distinctive sort of cognitive phenomenology (by what it's like to have them) are prima facie committed to intrinsicalism about intentional content, according to which the content of a thought is determined by its intrinsic properties. Such theories are in conflict with an account of the content of indexical thoughts (thoughts whose expression involves the utterance of indexicals) that is a natural extension of the standard account of the semantics of sentences containing demonstratives or indexicals. This chapter argues that the intuitions supporting the standard semantics of indexicals, and their extension to the contents of indexical concepts, are not inevitable, and that there is a workable and intuitively satisfying alternative consistent with intrinsicalism about phenomenally constituted intentional content.

Keywords:   intentionality, content, phenomenology, indexicals, demonstratives, internalism

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .