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Phenomenal Intentionality$
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Uriah Kriegel

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199764297

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764297.001.0001

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The Access Problem

The Access Problem

Chapter:
(p.27) 2 The Access Problem
Source:
Phenomenal Intentionality
Author(s):

Michelle Montague

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764297.003.0002

We enter into many mental states which involve intentional relations with objects. What mechanism determines which objects our mental states are of or about? The chapter calls this the ‘access problem’. The chapter argues that there is at least one ineliminable ‘internal’ condition on mental access to objects, in addition to whatever ‘external’ conditions there may be.

Keywords:   intentionality, phenomenology, object-positing, the access problem, Russell's Principle, perception

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