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Phenomenal Intentionality$
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Uriah Kriegel

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199764297

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764297.001.0001

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Does Phenomenology Ground Mental Content?

Does Phenomenology Ground Mental Content?

(p.194) 11 Does Phenomenology Ground Mental Content?
Phenomenal Intentionality

Adam Pautz

Oxford University Press

The chapter criticizes the thesis that “cognitive phenomenology” might help ground mental content. Criticisms concern what the chapter calls “altered cognitive qualia cases”, “absent cognitive qualia cases”, and “disembodied cognitive qualia cases”. But the chapter defends a thesis in the same vicinity. In the chapter's view, it is sensory phenomenology, not “cognitive phenomenology”, that is the source of all determinate intentionality. To explain how, a modified version of David Lewis’s theory of mental content is developed.

Keywords:   cognitive phenomenology, phenomenal intentionality, naturalization, externalism, internalism, David Lewis

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