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Phenomenal Intentionality$
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Uriah Kriegel

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199764297

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764297.001.0001

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Intellectual Gestalts

Intellectual Gestalts

Chapter:
(p.174) 10 Intellectual Gestalts
Source:
Phenomenal Intentionality
Author(s):

Elijah Chudnoff

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764297.003.0010

Phenomenal holism is the thesis that some phenomenal characters can only be instantiated by experiences that are parts of certain wholes. The first aim of this paper is to defend phenomenal holism. The chapter argues, moreover, that there are complex intellectual experiences (intellectual gestalts)—such as experiences of grasping a proof—whose parts instantiate holistic phenomenal characters. Proponents of cognitive phenomenology believe that some phenomenal characters can only be instantiated by experiences that are not purely sensory. The second aim of this chapter is to defend cognitive phenomenology. The chapter argues that reflection on intellectual gestalts provides a basis for developing a case for cognitive phenomenology that is immune to many of the worries that beset more familiar arguments for cognitive phenomenology.

Keywords:   phenomenal intentionality, cognitive phenomenology, phenomenal holism, gestalt theory, mathematical proof

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