This chapter concludes that, contrary to conventional wisdom, adversarial legalism does not “crowd out” other forms of politics, create uniquely path-dependent outcomes, or generate a unified backlash. Instead, it generates a more fractious politics as compared to bureaucratic legalism. In the cases in the book, the politics of adversarial legalism starts in a decentralized way, with individual lawsuits against individual defendants. When litigation gains momentum, however, a fractious interest group politics develops in Congress, with parties divided among winners and losers, victims and villains. The bureaucratic legalism cases in the book had an inverse trajectory, in which the scope of political conflict narrowed over time. In those cases creation was the most contentious stage, but after that a less-contested interest group politics emerged, with business interests largely deferring to key members of Congress and experts. The chapter ends by urging scholars to adopt the book’s comparative developmental approach to studying the politics of judicialization in other contexts.
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.