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Kant’s Thinker$
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Patricia Kitcher

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199754823

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199754823.001.0001

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Arguing for Apperception

Arguing for Apperception

Chapter:
(p.115) 9 Arguing for Apperception
Source:
Kant’s Thinker
Author(s):

Patricia Kitcher (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199754823.003.0009

In this chapter the background materials from the Empiricists, the Rationalists, and Kant’s earlier work, and the interpretations of the structure of the transcendental deduction and of the crucial notion of ‘synthesis’ are brought together in an account of the argument that the ‘unity of apperception’ is a necessary condition for rational cognition. The chapter explains in more detail what Kant understands by ‘rational cognition’ and it clarifies his various formulations of the ‘principle of apperception.’ It also shows how the theory of apperception fits into the deduction of the legitimacy of the categories and it considers the relations between transcendental and empirical apperception.

Keywords:   rational cognition, transcendental deduction, principle of apperception, transcendental apperception, empirical apperception

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