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Kant’s Thinker$
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Patricia Kitcher

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199754823

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199754823.001.0001

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Strands of Argument in the Duisburg Nachlaβ

Strands of Argument in the Duisburg Nachlaβ

Chapter:
(p.66) 6 Strands of Argument in the Duisburg Nachlaβ
Source:
Kant’s Thinker
Author(s):

Patricia Kitcher (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199754823.003.0006

This chapter looks at a set of unpublished notes that contain Kant’s first systematic discussion of ‘apperception’ in relation to the requirements of cognition. One interpretive controversy surrounding the notes is whether the ‘apperception’ they discuss is ‘substantial’ (the view of Wolfgang Carl), ‘empirical’ (the view of Paul Guyer), or something else. By considering the materials that Kant had available at the time of these notes (around 1775), we can appreciate the breakthrough that enabled him finally to produce a transcendental deduction centered on the notion of ‘apperception’ half a decade later, viz. the recognition that the representation ‘I-think’ has no content of its own.

Keywords:   apperception, substantial subject, empirical subject, Wolfgang Carl, Paul Guyer

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