Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Kant’s Thinker$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Patricia Kitcher

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199754823

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199754823.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 22 October 2019

Is Kant’s Thinker (as Such) a Free and Responsible Agent?

Is Kant’s Thinker (as Such) a Free and Responsible Agent?

Chapter:
(p.238) 14 Is Kant’s Thinker (as Such) a Free and Responsible Agent?
Source:
Kant’s Thinker
Author(s):

Patricia Kitcher (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199754823.003.0014

Both Kant scholars (Henry Allison) and Kant enthusiasts (Akeel Bilgrami) have appealed to the Critique to support the assimilation of cognition to responsible moral action. This approach is encouraged by Kant’s claim that there is only one reason, so theoretical and practical reason must be one and the same. This chapter argues that Kant’s mature moral theory underlies his earlier claim about ‘one reason’ and that, together, his cognitive theory and his mature moral theory imply that the differences between the activities involved in rational cognition and in moral deliberation and moral action are at least as consequential as their similarities.

Keywords:   unity of reason, rational cognition, moral action, Henry Allison

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .