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Kant’s Thinker$
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Patricia Kitcher

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199754823

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199754823.001.0001

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Is Kant’s Theory Consistent?

Is Kant’s Theory Consistent?

Chapter:
(p.203) 12 Is Kant’s Theory Consistent?
Source:
Kant’s Thinker
Author(s):

Patricia Kitcher (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199754823.003.0012

This chapter defends Kant’s theory of cognition and apperception against a venerable and potentially devastating criticism: His theory is inconsistent, because the subject and objects of cognition can be neither phenomenal nor noumenal, but by his metaphysical theory, all things must be one or the other. Through analyzing some crucial passages where Kant became confused about how to describe the origins of cognition, I argue that he is consistent that the objects and subjects of cognition are phenomena.

Keywords:   phenomenal/noumenal distinction, origins of cognition, consistency of Kant’s theory

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