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Good GodThe Theistic Foundations of Morality$
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David Baggett and Jerry L. Walls

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199751808

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199751808.001.0001

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Moral Apologia

Moral Apologia

Chapter:
(p.7) 1 Moral Apologia
Source:
Good God
Author(s):

David Baggett (Contributor Webpage)

Jerry L. Walls (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199751808.003.0002

This chapter lays out a variety of distinguishable but related moral arguments for God's existence, making the case that moral duties, freedoms, and regrets are considerably more at home in and better explained by a theistic world than an atheistic one. The moral argument has the advantage of contending for a perfectly, necessarily, and recognizably good God, and a robust theistic worldview can contribute to a solution to Sidgwick's dualism of the practical reason. A theistic ethic also captures the insights of but avoids the problems with aspects of Platonism and existentialism.

Keywords:   dualism of the practical reason, Platonism, existentialism, egoism, moral obligations, free will, naturalism, moral responsibility, regret

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