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No Sure VictoryMeasuring U.S. Army Effectiveness and Progress in the Vietnam War$
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Gregory A. Daddis

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199746873

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199746873.001.0001

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“A Time for Testing”

“A Time for Testing”

(p.157) 7 “A Time for Testing”
No Sure Victory

Gregory A. Daddis

Oxford University Press

This chapter analyzes how MACV attempted to measure its effectiveness in training the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) for providing national security once American forces departed. After Nixon’s inauguration in 1969, Vietnamization became the stated primary mission of U.S forces in Vietnam. How did MACV attempt to measure the performance of ARVN forces? How did MACV assess which factors indicated the successful training of ARVN? This chapter explores whether American officers understood that their metrics for effectiveness in search-and-destroy or pacification missions might not apply to the training of ARVN forces. North Vietnamese leaders reassessed their own strategy after Tet and reverted to an emphasis on political action and guerrilla warfare. Did MACV see the enemy’s change in strategy as a validation of U.S. efforts to this point in the war?

Keywords:   ARVN, Vietnamization, Nixon, Vietnam strategy, South Vietnam

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