This chapter describes the most important moral dimensions of human rights. Moral human rights presuppose basic human needs because they are grounded primarily on the harms normally inflicted on their possessors by their violation. International human rights are typically justified as protections of analogous moral human rights, but they can also be justified by their contributions to world peace, friendly relations, or social justice. Treaty rights presuppose the moral principle that agreements are to be observed, and customary human rights presuppose the principle that custom is to be observed. The incorporation of human rights in national legal systems is justified primarily as protections of analogous moral human rights. These moral dimensions are illustrated by a case study assessing their relevance to the alleged use of torture by the Bush administration.
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.