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HeuristicsThe Foundations of Adaptive Behavior$
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Gerd Gigerenzer, Ralph Hertwig, and Thorsten Pachur

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199744282

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744282.001.0001

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On the Psychology of the Recognition Heuristic: Retrieval Primacy as a Key Determinant of Its Use

On the Psychology of the Recognition Heuristic: Retrieval Primacy as a Key Determinant of Its Use

Chapter:
(p.477) Chapter 23 On the Psychology of the Recognition Heuristic: Retrieval Primacy as a Key Determinant of Its Use
Source:
Heuristics
Author(s):

Thorsten Pachur (Contributor Webpage)

Ralph Hertwig (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744282.003.0023

The recognition heuristic is a prime example of a boundedly rational mind tool that rests on an evolved capacity, recognition, and exploits environmental structures. When originally proposed, it was conjectured that no other probabilistic cue reverses the recognition-based inference (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002). More recent studies challenged this view and gave rise to the argument that recognition enters inferences just like any other probabilistic cue. By linking research on the heuristic with research on recognition memory, the chapter argues that the retrieval of recognition information is not tantamount to the retrieval of other probabilistic cues. Specifically, the retrieval of subjective recognition precedes that of an objective probabilistic cue and occurs at little to no cognitive cost. This retrieval primacy gives rise to two predictions, both of which have been empirically supported: Inferences in line with the recognition heuristic (a) are made faster than inferences inconsistent with it and (b) are more prevalent under time pressure. Suspension of the heuristic, in contrast, requires additional time, and direct knowledge of the criterion variable, if available, can trigger such suspension.

Keywords:   decision making, ecological rationality, fast-and-frugal heuristics, memory, recognition

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