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The Sources of Intentionality$
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Uriah Kriegel

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199742974

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199742974.001.0001

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The Nature of Experiential Intentionality

The Nature of Experiential Intentionality

I. A Higher-Order Tracking Theory

(p.67) 2 The Nature of Experiential Intentionality
The Sources of Intentionality

Uriah Kriegel

Oxford University Press

Developing a philosophical account of experiential intentionality requires answering the following question: For any mental state x and property F, what would make it the case that F figures in the experiential-intentional content of x? This chapters discuss tracking accounts of experiential intentionality (Section 2.1), goes on to argue against such accounts (Section 2.2), and then formulates and defends a higher-order tracking theory (Section 2.3), before closing with some objections and replies (Section 2.4). According to the higher-order tracking theory, a property F figures in the experiential-intentional content of a state x just in case x is suitably higher-order tracked to track F. What this exactly means becomes clearer in the course of the chapter. The overall thesis of this chapter is that although the standard tracking theory is rather implausible, the higher-order tracking theory is quite plausible.

Keywords:   experiential intentionality, tracking, higher-rrder theory, mental representation, informational semantics, self-representationalism

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