Ontology is difficult. If we read what we take to exist directly off of the way we speak, we’ll find that we are “committed” to all manner of strange things. By means of case studies—numbers, hallucinations, and fictions—a more nuanced relation between what there is and what is true has been indicated in the preceding chapters of this book. This includes a more careful understanding of what we mean when we say, for example, “No Disney characters that are talking yaks exist.” What is meant isn’t the simple denial of the existence of talking yaks that are Disney characters—this is clear by the fact that someone can say in the next breath that there are, however, plenty of talking sheep that are Disney characters. The role of intuitions in philosophical methodology is also discussed in this chapter.
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