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Philosophy of Science MattersThe Philosophy of Peter Achinstein$
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Gregory J. Morgan

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199738625

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199738625.001.0001

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What's So Great about an Objective Concept of Evidence?

What's So Great about an Objective Concept of Evidence?

Chapter:
(p.124) 10 What's So Great about an Objective Concept of Evidence?
Source:
Philosophy of Science Matters
Author(s):

Helen Longino

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199738625.003.0010

This essay argues (1) that Achinstein's objective account of evidence does have some utility for scientists, but (2) that it requires supplementation to achieve that utility, and (3) that the philosophical claims (in which this chapter is interested) are not really supported by the analysis.

Keywords:   evidence, contextualism, objective concept

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