Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Mind$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Jonathan Ellis and Daniel Guevara

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199737666

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199737666.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 16 July 2019

Sensation, Introspection, and the Phenomenal

Sensation, Introspection, and the Phenomenal

Chapter:
(p.183) Chapter 8 Sensation, Introspection, and the Phenomenal
Source:
Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Mind
Author(s):

Jonathan Ellis

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199737666.003.0009

Employing themes from Wittgenstein, the chapter argues against a standard assumption which he takes to be at the center of contemporary philosophy of mind. According to this assumption, held by “representationalists” and “qualia realists” alike, in order for a broadly “physicalist” conception of the world to be correct, every sensation, experience, and so forth, that has phenomenal character must be identical to a particular physical phenomenon (a physical process, or physical state, event, property, etc.); that is, it must be identical to a phenomenon fully specifiable in physical terms. This chapter’s primary interest is not so much in defending the thesis of physicalism as it is in exposing the misconception of sensation (and the like) upon which it claims the standard assumption rests. The chapter attempts to undermine this conception by way of a close study of the role that introspection plays in philosophical contexts.

Keywords:   Wittgenstein, phenomenal character, phenomenal quality, what it’s like, sensation, qualia, representationalism, representationism, introspection, physicalism, materialism, consciousness

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .