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Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Mind$
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Jonathan Ellis and Daniel Guevara

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199737666

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199737666.001.0001

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Seeing an Aspect and Seeing under an Aspect

Seeing an Aspect and Seeing under an Aspect

Chapter:
(p.37) Chapter 2 Seeing an Aspect and Seeing under an Aspect
Source:
Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Mind
Author(s):

Brian O’Shaughnessy

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199737666.003.0003

This chapter is concerned to show how Wittgenstein’s later-period discussions of the varieties of aspect perception call attention to the fact that understanding is centrally and irreducibly involved in visual experience. When we see the duck-rabbit as a duck, the visual experience cannot accurately be broken down into parts, separating “the exercise of the Understanding in visual experience and the visual experiencing of the ‘understood’ visibilia,” O’Shaughnessy says. The chapter claims that even ordinary, everyday seeing of a fork, say, involves seeing the fork as a fork, although it notes that Wittgenstein himself may not have been prepared to go that far. Nevertheless, it will be of interest to those who have followed this chapter’s author’s own distinctive and influential contributions to the philosophy of perception to see how much common ground there appears to be between him and Wittgenstein on these issues, and in particular on the specific ways in which they take the understanding to be central to perception. Close readers of this author’s work know that, although decidedly not a Wittgensteinian, he has been influenced by Wittgenstein, and the chapter briefly describes that influence here for the first time in an anecdotal and charming preamble to his chapter.

Keywords:   Wittgenstein, aspect perception, visual experience, understanding, duck-rabbit, gestalt

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