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Political Parties, Business Groups, and Corruption in Developing Countries$
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Vineeta Yadav

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199735907

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199735907.001.0001

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Institutions, Lobbying, and Corruption: A Theoretical Framework

Institutions, Lobbying, and Corruption: A Theoretical Framework

Chapter:
(p.24) 2 Institutions, Lobbying, and Corruption: A Theoretical Framework
Source:
Political Parties, Business Groups, and Corruption in Developing Countries
Author(s):

Vineeta Yadav (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199735907.003.0002

This chapter presents a theoretical framework that analyzes how differences in the lobbying strategies of business interest groups emerge from differences in their legislative institutions, establishes the link between these institutionally inspired lobbying strategies and patterns of corrupt behaviors, and analyzes which of these patterns is more likely to lead to higher political and general corruption. It argues that countries with legislative institutions that incentivize lobbying directed at political parties will experience higher corruption than those countries that incentivize lobbying directed at individual legislators. This is the central hypothesis of this book.

Keywords:   lobbying, business interest groups, legislative institutions, corrupt behavior

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