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The Epistemology of DisagreementNew Essays$
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David Christensen and Jennifer Lackey

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199698370

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199698370.001.0001

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Perspectivalism and Reflective Ascent

Perspectivalism and Reflective Ascent

Chapter:
(p.223) 10 Perspectivalism and Reflective Ascent
Source:
The Epistemology of Disagreement
Author(s):

Jonathan L. Kvanvig

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199698370.003.0011

The point of this essay by Jonathan Kvanvig is to draw three threads into a common cord to show what a fully fallibilistic approach to rationality ought to look like. The three threads concern what it is for rationality to be perspectival, why rational disagreement can always arise even when controls are in place for total evidence and competency, and why fallibility does not fly in the face of a strong preference for full unity in an account of normativity. The goal then is to provide an account of normativity that has no need of an independent notion of excusability (though of course there will still be excusable actions and beliefs) and no tendency to sniff the air for the scent of irrationality when people disagree.

Keywords:   rationality, perspectivalism, fallibilism, uniqueness, mens rea, excusability, normativity

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