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Human Rights and the United Kingdom Supreme Court$
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Brice Dickson

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199697458

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199697458.001.0001

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The Supreme Court’s Conception of Human Rights

The Supreme Court’s Conception of Human Rights

Chapter:
(p.17) 2 The Supreme Court’s Conception of Human Rights
Source:
Human Rights and the United Kingdom Supreme Court
Author(s):

Brice Dickson

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199697458.003.0002

This chapter considers what role human rights played in the development of the common law and suggests that the concept of liberties was much more frequently cited than that of rights. It examines whether the top UK court is in favour of the concept of constitutional rights and concludes that it is not, but for good reasons. The impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 is explained and contextualized, with particular reference to human rights under the common law, human rights protected by legislation other than the Human Rights Act, and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The chapter criticizes the Supreme Court for adhering to the ‘mirror’ principle and to the ‘outcome not process’ approach to human rights. It urges the Court to adopt an approach based instead on the rule of law.

Keywords:   liberties, constitutional rights, mirror principle, EU Charter, rule of law

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