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Quine versus DavidsonTruth, Reference, and Meaning$
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Gary Kemp

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199695621

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695621.001.0001

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Davidson’s Semantics

Davidson’s Semantics

Chapter:
(p.65) 2 Davidson’s Semantics
Source:
Quine versus Davidson
Author(s):

Gary Kemp

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695621.003.0003

This chapter presents the principal aspects of Davidson’s philosophy of language. Davidson famously inverts the Tarskian account of truth as resting on facts about meaning, to deliver an account of meaning in terms of truth. After isolating the nature of the idea that a theory of truth can serve as a theory of meaning, the chapter discusses radical interpretation and semantical holism, the concept of reference, the interdependence of meaning and belief, and the role of the principle of charity.

Keywords:   Davidson, truth, Tarski, meaning, radical interpretation, reference, belief

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