Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Quine versus DavidsonTruth, Reference, and Meaning$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Gary Kemp

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199695621

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695621.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 20 July 2019

Facets of Naturalism

Facets of Naturalism

(p.15) 1 Facets of Naturalism
Quine versus Davidson

Gary Kemp

Oxford University Press

Quine’s naturalism is not well appreciated for either its force or its detail. It is a scientific view of what science, knowledge and objectivity amount to that takes seriously the fact that such a view is benignly circular: there is no point of view commanding knowledge or science that transcends science. After explaining how Quine himself accepted the view after his famous responses to Carnap, the chapter discusses naturalized epistemology and its implications for the study of language, the specter of indeterminacy, the fundamental importance for naturalism of the inscrutability of reference, and the place within naturalism of ontology. The chapter concludes with the implications for compositionality, truth, semantical holism, instrumentalism, realism, objectivity, the status of psychological characterization and the propositional attitudes.

Keywords:   Quine, science, naturalized epistemology, language, inscrutability of reference, ontology, compositionality, truth, holism, realism

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .