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The A Priori in Philosophy$
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Albert Casullo and Joshua C. Thurow

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199695331

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695331.001.0001

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Concepts, Teleology, and Rational Revision *

Concepts, Teleology, and Rational Revision *

Chapter:
(p.134) 6 Concepts, Teleology, and Rational Revision*
Source:
The A Priori in Philosophy
Author(s):

Christopher S. Hill

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695331.003.0007

In concert with his attack on analyticity, Quine argued that no proposition is immune to empirical revision. In principle, at least, it is possible even for the laws of logic and mathematics to be called into question by empirical evidence. This chapter responds to this view, urging that it is possible to explain immunity to revision in terms of relativity clear notions, and arguing that the resulting conception of immunity applies to a fairly broad range of propositions, including abbreviative definitions, the laws of classical logic, and the laws of mathematics.

Keywords:   analyticity, a priority, classical logic, concepts, constitutive proposition, definition, disjunction, epistemic probability, evidence, individuation, quantum logic, Quine, revisability, teleology

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