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The Unity of Linguistic Meaning$
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John Collins

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199694846

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199694846.001.0001

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Clarification and defence

Clarification and defence

Chapter:
(p.128) 6 Clarification and defence
Source:
The Unity of Linguistic Meaning
Author(s):

John Collins

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199694846.003.0006

There are three strands of justification for the account of combinatorial unity presented in the last chapter. The first is negative: the other extant accounts of unity are, I have argued, either partial or face insuperable problems. The second is positive: the account satisfies our three desiderata. The third reason is that the account withstands a host of likely objections: philosophical, formal, and linguistic. To give substance to this last strand of justification is the job of the last two chapters. In the present chapter, the focus will be on philosophical and formal matters. In particular, the account on offer will be distinguisged from similar accounts recently offered by Jeff King and Scott Soames. The next chapter will consider matters arising in linguistics about the status of Merge.

Keywords:   logical form, Scott Soames, Jeff King, circularity, characteristic function, internalism vs. externalism

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