Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Understanding Other MindsPerspectives from developmental social neuroscience$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Simon Baron-Cohen, Michael Lombardo, and Helen Tager-Flusberg

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199692972

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199692972.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 22 May 2019

Mind attribution is for morality

Mind attribution is for morality

(p.93) Chapter 6 Mind attribution is for morality
Understanding Other Minds

Liane Young

Adam Waytz

Oxford University Press

Mental state reasoning is crucial for moral evaluation and social interaction. In the first half of the paper, we discuss recent and ongoing work on mental state reasoning for moral evaluation – judging agents from a position “on high” as an observer or a judge. In the second half of the paper, we turn to moral cognition “on the ground” – mental state reasoning for social interaction. We discuss evidence indicating distinct behavioral and neural signatures of mental state reasoning for distinct motivational contexts – for interacting with ingroups versus outgroups, for cooperation versus competition, and for affiliation versus action prediction.

Keywords:   moral judgment and behavior, mind attribution, group membership, effectance motivation, social connection

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .