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Perception, Causation, and Objectivity$
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Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman, and Naomi Eilan

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199692040

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199692040.001.0001

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Perceptual Concepts as Non-causal Concepts

Perceptual Concepts as Non-causal Concepts

(p.121) 9 Perceptual Concepts as Non-causal Concepts
Perception, Causation, and Objectivity

Paul Snowdon

Oxford University Press

The question discussed is whether our perceptual concepts should be thought of as causal concepts. The notion of a causal concept is clarified, as is the nature of the question, and it is argued that there is insufficient evidence to support the claim that perceptual concepts are causal concepts. It is also argued that in the nature of the case it is very hard to demonstrate that the concepts are non-causal. Part of the evidence considered is that provided in earlier publications by Bill Child. An alternative, although partial, treatment of these concepts is sketched.

Keywords:   causal concepts, causal theories of perception, objectivity, G.E.M. Anscombe, Bill Child

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