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Perception, Causation, and Objectivity$
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Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman, and Naomi Eilan

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199692040

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199692040.001.0001

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Causation in Commonsense Realism

Causation in Commonsense Realism

Chapter:
(p.103) 8 Causation in Commonsense Realism
Source:
Perception, Causation, and Objectivity
Author(s):

Johannes Roessler

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199692040.003.0008

According to P.F. Strawson, a causal requirement on perception is implicit in everyday explanations of what someone knows in terms of what they perceive. In this paper I argue that this putative ‘rationale' for the causal theory of perception is premised on a questionable assumption, that making perceptual knowledge intelligible in terms of perception requires explaining our possession of reliably true perceptual beliefs. I present and defend an alternative interpretation of the commonsense psychology of perceptual knowledge, on which object perception is a causal enabling condition of epistemic perception. I also consider the bearing of this account on the relational view of perceptual experience.

Keywords:   perceptual knowledge, causal theory of perception, objectivity, relational view of experience

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