Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Perception, Causation, and Objectivity$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman, and Naomi Eilan

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199692040

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199692040.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 11 July 2020

Experiential Objectivity

Experiential Objectivity

(p.51) 4 Experiential Objectivity
Perception, Causation, and Objectivity

Naomi Eilan

Oxford University Press

Contra sense datum theories, most philosophers hold that perceptions have immediate ‘objective import'. How should the possession by a perception of such import be explained? The paper suggests that two important dimensions along which accounts of perceptual objectivity divide turn on answers to the following questions. (1) The Division of Labour Question: should the full content of our commonsense realism about the world we perceive be thought of as part of the actual content of perception itself or something the theorist of perception assumes? (2) The Consciousness Question: is it possible to derive explanations of the objectivity of conscious perceptions from an account of the objectivity possessed by non-conscious perceptions? The paper argues that a relational theory of perceptual consciousness delivers a negative answer (with Burge and contra Strawson) to the first, and a negative answer(with Strawson and contra Burge) to the second, exploiting the key insights in each of these philosophers approaches.

Keywords:   perceptual objectivity, commonsense realism, perceptual consciousness, blindsight, relational theory, Strawson, Burge

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .