Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Perception, Causation, and Objectivity$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman, and Naomi Eilan

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199692040

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199692040.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 11 July 2020

Tackling Berkeley's Puzzle

Tackling Berkeley's Puzzle

Chapter:
(p.18) 2 Tackling Berkeley's Puzzle
Source:
Perception, Causation, and Objectivity
Author(s):

Quassim Cassam

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199692040.003.0002

It seems that we have the conception of objects of experience as mind-independent. Berkeley argues that it is possible for us to have this conception only if it is made available to us by experience (the Explanatory Requirement) and that experience cannot make this conception available to us (the Experience Premise). John Campbell's response is to reject the Experience Premise on the basis of a Relational View of experience. This chapter criticizes Campbell's response to Berkeley and proposes an alternative response inspired by Kant. This response focuses on the role of the Explanatory Requirement in Berkeley's argument and proposes that when this requirement is properly understood it poses no threat to our possession of the conception of objects as mind-independent.

Keywords:   Berkeley, Campbell, Kant, The Relational View of experience, mind-independent objects

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .