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Perception, Causation, and Objectivity$
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Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman, and Naomi Eilan

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199692040

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199692040.001.0001

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Causal Perception and Causal Cognition

Causal Perception and Causal Cognition

(p.229) 14 Causal Perception and Causal Cognition
Perception, Causation, and Objectivity

Jim Woodward

Oxford University Press

This chapter explores the role played by the so-called perception of causation in our more general capacity for causal thinking. I suggest that ordinary adult human causal cognition as well as a great deal of philosophical and psychological theorizing about such cognition is influenced by two different conceptions of causation, one of which is associated with the idea that causes make a difference for their effects and the other of which is associated with idea that causes must be appropriately “connected” to their effects. These conceptions are logically distinct and can yield different causal judgments but are nonetheless usually well-integrated in adult causal thinking. An important developmental question is how such integration occurs.

Keywords:   causal perception, causal judgment, causal process theories, causal learning, development of causal reasoning

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