- Title Pages
- The Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights
- 1 On the Foundations of Human Rights
- 2 Response to John Tasioulas
- 3 Human Rights as Fundamental Conditions for a Good Life
- 4 From a Good Life to Human Rights Some Complications
- 5 Is Dignity the Foundation of Human Rights?
- 6 Human Rights, Natural Rights, and Human Dignity
- 7 Personal Deserts and Human Rights
- 8 Can Moral Desert Qualify or Justify Human Rights?
- 9 A Social Ontology of Human Rights
- 10 Human Rights, Human Dignity, and Power
- 11 Human Rights in the Emerging World Order
- 12 Joseph Raz on Human Rights A Critical Appraisal
- 13 Why <i>International Legal</i> Human Rights?
- 14 Human Rights Pragmatism and Human Dignity
- 15 Human Rights and Constitutional Law
- 16 Specifying Human Rights
- 17 Rescuing Proportionality
- 18 Rescuing Human Rights from Proportionality
- 19 Free Speech as an Inverted Right and Democratic Persuasion<sup>*</sup>
- 20 Free Speech and “Democratic Persuasion”
- 21 Freedom of Religion in a Secular World
- 22 Religious Liberty Conceived as a Human Right
- 23 The Right to Security
- 24 Rights and Security for Human Rights Sceptics
- 25 Self-determination and the Human Right to Democracy
- 26 A Human Right to Democracy?
- 27 The Content of the Human Right to Health
- 28 Do We Have a Human Right to the Political Determinants of Health?
- 29 A Moral Inconsistency Argument for a Basic Human Right to Subsistence
- 30 The Force of Subsistence Rights
- 31 The Relativity and Ethnocentricity of Human Rights<sup>*</sup>
- 32 Human Needs, Human Rights<sup>*</sup>
- 33 Liberty Rights and the Limits of Liberal Democracy
- 34 Human Rights Without the Human Good?
- 35 Care and Human Rights
- 36 Care and Human Rights
- 37 Human Rights in Kantian Mode
- 38 Why there Cannot be a Truly Kantian Theory of Human Rights
Human Rights in Kantian Mode
Human Rights in Kantian Mode
- (p.653) 37 Human Rights in Kantian Mode
- Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights
- Oxford University Press
This chapter sketches a transcendent human rights conception, the distinguishing feature of which is its acknowledgement of human cognitive and moral fallibility. It begins by setting out Kant’s division of the domain of ordinary morality in general, treating his systematic approach as emblematic of his general philosophical non-foundationalism. It then sketches a non-foundationalist interpretation of innate Right before turning to the idea of human rights as a critically transcendent idea of pure practical (moral) reasoning. It concludes with some remarks on what is distinctive about the proposed transcendent human rights conception.
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