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Kant and Rational Psychology$
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Corey W. Dyck

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780199688296

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199688296.001.0001

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Kant and Rationalist Psychologies

(p.226) Conclusion
Kant and Rational Psychology

Corey W. Dyck

Oxford University Press

In the conclusion, the applicability of the foregoing account of illusion and error to the narrowly rationalistic psychologist, typically represented by Descartes and Leibniz, is considered. It is argued that this psychologist falls prey to illusion inasmuch as he overlooks the minimally empirical character of the consciousness of the existence of the I think, in contrast to the Wolffian’s inflation of this consciousness. It is further contended that Leibniz’s account of the soul is not comfortably characterized as narrowly rationalistic but instead bears an unmistakable resemblance to Wolff’s.

Keywords:   Kant, Leibniz, rationalism, psychology

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