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The Predictive Mind$
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Jakob Hohwy

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199682737

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199682737.001.0001

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Concluding remarks: The mind in prediction

Concluding remarks: The mind in prediction

Chapter:
(p.258) Concluding remarks: The mind in prediction
Source:
The Predictive Mind
Author(s):

Jakob Hohwy

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199682737.003.0014

A brief concluding section summarizes the main points that have emerged from considering the predictive mind. The mind exists in prediction. Our perceptual experience of the world arises in our attempts at predicting our own current sensory input. This notion spreads to attention and agency. Perception, attention and agency are three different ways of doing the same thing: accounting for sensory input as well as we can from inside the confines of the skull. We are good at this, mostly, but it is a precarious and fragile process because we are hostages to our prior beliefs, our noisy brains, the uncertain sensory deliverances from the world, and to the brain’s urge to rid itself efficiently of prediction error. Intriguing approaches to a number of different mental phenomena arise from applying to them the simple idea that the brain does nothing but minimize its prediction error.

Keywords:   prediction error minimization

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