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Impassioned Belief$
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Michael Ridge

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780199682669

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199682669.001.0001

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Rationality

Rationality

Chapter:
(p.225) 8 Rationality
Source:
Impassioned Belief
Author(s):

Michael Ridge

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199682669.003.0009

This chapter defends a theory of rationality which takes internal coherence/consistency as its defining feature. Such an approach preserves the necessary connections between ‘rational’ in the capacity sense and ‘rational’ in the success sense. The proposed instrumentalist conception of rationality also coheres very well with Ecumenical Expressivism, in that the two views together can more elegantly explain the irrationality of akrasia than rival accounts. Finally, the chapter considers the arguments used to motivate expressivism for other forms of practically normative thought and discourse, and explains why those arguments do not carry over to the case of thought and discourse about practical rationality.

Keywords:   Ecumenical Cognitivism, Ecumenical Expressivism, normative discourse, normative thought, akrasia

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