This chapter defends a theory of rationality which takes internal coherence/consistency as its defining feature. Such an approach preserves the necessary connections between ‘rational’ in the capacity sense and ‘rational’ in the success sense. The proposed instrumentalist conception of rationality also coheres very well with Ecumenical Expressivism, in that the two views together can more elegantly explain the irrationality of akrasia than rival accounts. Finally, the chapter considers the arguments used to motivate expressivism for other forms of practically normative thought and discourse, and explains why those arguments do not carry over to the case of thought and discourse about practical rationality.
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