Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Being Realistic about Reasons | Oxford Scholarship Online
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Being Realistic about Reasons

T. M. Scanlon

Abstract

It is often claimed that irreducibly normative truths would have unacceptable metaphysical implications, and are incompatible with a scientific view of the world. The book argues, on the basis of a general account of the relevance of ontological questions, that this claim is mistaken. It is also a mistake to think that interpreting normative judgments as beliefs would make it impossible to explain their connection with action. An agent’s acceptance of a normative judgment can explain that agent’s subsequent action because it is part of being a rational agent that such an agent’s beliefs about ... More

Keywords: reasons, rationality, normative, ontology, reflective equilibrium, epistemology, constructivism

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2014 Print ISBN-13: 9780199678488
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2014 DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199678488.001.0001

Authors

Affiliations are at time of print publication.

T. M. Scanlon, author
Alford Professor of Natural Religion, Moral Philosophy, and Civil Polity, Harvard University