Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 8$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Russ Shafer-Landau

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199678044

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199678044.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 27 May 2019

Truth Conditions and the Meanings of Ethical Terms 1

Truth Conditions and the Meanings of Ethical Terms 1

(p.195) 8 Truth Conditions and the Meanings of Ethical Terms1
Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 8

Alex Silk

Oxford University Press

This chapter motivates and develops what can be called a condition semantics for moral terms. An important function of language is to distinguish among ways the world might be. But sentences can also distinguish among ways things might be more broadly. According to condition semantics, moral sentences conventionally distinguish among moral standards (or test whether a moral standard meets a certain condition) just as ordinary factual sentences conventionally distinguish among possible worlds (or test whether a possible world meets a certain condition). This point is captured formally within an extension of a familiar truth-conditional paradigm. The resulting analysis improves upon its main competitors: invariantism and contextualism. The framework of condition semantics also offers a perspicuous way of posing various classical metaethical questions—e.g. concerning relativism, expressivism, and judgement internalism. This can motivate clearer, better motivated answers and suggest new ways the dialectic may proceed.

Keywords:   condition semantics, invariantism, contextualism, relativism, expressivism, semantic competence, truth-conditions, attitude ascriptions

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .