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Environment and Development EconomicsEssays in Honour of Sir Partha Dasgupta$
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Scott Barrett, Karl-Göran Mäler, and Eric S. Maskin

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780199677856

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199677856.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 16 November 2019

Why Cooperation is Better

Why Cooperation is Better

The Gains to Cooperative Management of the Argentine Shortfin Squid Fishery in South America

Chapter:
(p.270) 13 Why Cooperation is Better
Source:
Environment and Development Economics
Author(s):

Sebastián Villasante

U. Rashid Sumaila

Manel Antelo

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199677856.003.0013

The Argentine shortfin squid (Illex argentinus) is exploited by various foreign fleets operating within Argentina’s exclusive economic zone, the adjacent area beyond the 200-mile limit, and in the waters of the Falklands (Malvinas) Islands, which are controlled by the United Kingdom. In managing this resource, Argentina and the United Kingdom face a stock externality, in which each nation's catch negatively impacts the other state. This chapter uses game theory to explore the ecological and economic implications of cooperative versus non-cooperative management of this fishery. The results suggest that recent management of the fishery is consistent with non-cooperative behavior. Were cooperation to succeed, both players would obtain a higher pay-off than in the non-cooperative outcome. They would, in particular, reduce their collective fishing effort, increase the abundance of the stock, and reduce the cost of fishing.

Keywords:   Argentine shortfin squid fishery, catches, fishing effort, fishery biomass, fisheries modelling, cooperation, non-cooperative game theory

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