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Environment and Development EconomicsEssays in Honour of Sir Partha Dasgupta$
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Scott Barrett, Karl-Göran Mäler, and Eric S. Maskin

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780199677856

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199677856.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 15 November 2019

An Optimal Contract for Monitoring Illegal Exploitation of Co-Managed Forests in Benin

An Optimal Contract for Monitoring Illegal Exploitation of Co-Managed Forests in Benin

Chapter:
(p.241) 11 An Optimal Contract for Monitoring Illegal Exploitation of Co-Managed Forests in Benin
Source:
Environment and Development Economics
Author(s):

Albert N. Honlonkou

Rashid Hassan

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199677856.003.0011

Benin’s forest reserves are seriously threatened by legal and illegal logging, among other activities. Since 1990, the government has adopted co-management as an institutional device to promote a sharing of power and responsibility among local community resource users and resource management agencies. This chapter develops an agency theory framework and employs it to evaluate the performance of this co-management arrangement. The analysis shows that the contract devised by the principal (the government) is seriously flawed. The arrangement should be revised based on agency theory principles. It is especially important to avoid a situation in which state intervention damages local institutions, turning common property resources into open access resources.

Keywords:   forest management, common property, co-management, monitoring, principal-agent theory

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