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Reason, Morality, and LawThe Philosophy of John Finnis$
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John Keown and Robert P. George

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199675500

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199675500.001.0001

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Law and Its Theory

Law and Its Theory

A Question of Priorities

Chapter:
(p.361) 22 Law and Its Theory
Source:
Reason, Morality, and Law
Author(s):

Julie Dickson

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199675500.003.0023

This chapter explores certain aspects of Finnis' views on law and its theory. It is organized as follows. Section II outlines an important and challenging duality in law's nature, and discusses those aspects of Finnis' views which attempt to do justice to it. Section III lays out and begins to analyse several different senses of explanatory priority which play important roles in various legal theorists' understanding of law and of jurisprudential methodology. Section IV discusses Finnis' position in respect of these priorities, and critically analyses the consequences of his views as regards his attempts to do justice to various aspects of law's nature.

Keywords:   John Finnis, nature of law, legal theory, jurisprudence

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