Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Consciousness and MeaningSelected Essays$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Brian Loar, Katalin Balog, and Stephanie Beardman

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780199673353

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: February 2017

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199673353.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 24 February 2020

Two Theories of Meaning

Two Theories of Meaning

(p.29) 2 Two Theories of Meaning
Consciousness and Meaning

Brian Loar

Oxford University Press

The two theories are Donald Davidson’s theory that a Tarski-style truth theory for a language can serve as a meaning theory for that language and the Gricean theory of intention-based semantics. Loar argues against Davidson’s theory, and uses the problems that defeat it to motivate the Gricean theory. He takes the outstanding problem for that theory to be the provision in Gricean terms of an account of sentence meaning in terms of the conditions that must obtain in order for a language to be the language of a given population, and the chapter culminates in an account of those conditions, one that doesn’t need to appeal to the Chomskian idea of an internally represented generative grammar.

Keywords:   Donald Davidson, Tarski-style truth theory, meaning theory for a language, Paul Grice, intention-based semantics, generative grammar, Noam Chomsky

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .