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Cognition Through UnderstandingSelf-Knowledge, Interlocution, Reasoning, Reflection: Philosophical Essays, Volume 3$
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Tyler Burge

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199672028

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672028.001.0001

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Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge

Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge

Chapter:
(p.68) 3 Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge
Source:
Cognition Through Understanding
Author(s):

Tyler Burge

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672028.003.0003

‘Our Entitlement to Self‐Knowledge’ (1996) argues that given the role that self‐knowledge plays in a familiar structure of critical reasoning (described in the essay), the relevant self‐knowledge must be not only non‐empirical, but immune to brute error. Brute error is the type of error that is compatible with being warranted in one’s belief and that does not derive from any sort of psychological misuse or malfunction. Intuitively, brute error in self‐attributions does not derive from internal shortcomings. It derives from normal inductive errors and from misperceptions of behavior that derive from abnormal observation conditions. The type of self‐attribution that underwrites the self‐knowledge that is integral to critical reasoning does not allow brute error: all errors in self‐attribution that invoke the competencies that underlie the relevant self‐knowledge derive from misuse of the competence.

Keywords:   entitlement, self-knowledge, brute error, non-empirical, apriori, self, critical reason

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