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Cognition Through UnderstandingSelf-Knowledge, Interlocution, Reasoning, Reflection: Philosophical Essays, Volume 3$
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Tyler Burge

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199672028

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672028.001.0001

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Reason and the First Person

Reason and the First Person

Chapter:
(p.383) 16 Reason and the First Person
Source:
Cognition Through Understanding
Author(s):

Tyler Burge

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672028.003.0016

‘Reason and the First Person’ (1998) argues that a use for the first‐person concept is guaranteed and legitimated by understanding what a reason is. Two aspects of understanding what a reason is are distinguished. One is understanding the role of the concept reason in evaluating or appraising. The other is understanding the role of the concept in moving one to apply evaluations or appraisals in reasoning–to affect attitudes in accord with reasons. Understanding the concept reason requires understanding this latter implementational role as well as the evaluative role. Understanding the implementational role requires an ability to mark conceptually, in particular instances, the attitudes or acts for which rational evaluation of an attitude or act enjoins immediately shaping it in accord with the rational evaluation. The first‐person concept marks those attitudes or acts that are subject to rationally immediate implementation.

Keywords:   first-person concept, reason, critical reason, person, self, self-understanding

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