This chapter presents climate change as a challenge to moral theory. It introduces the notion of a weakly collective moral duty, with correlative individual duties, as a way to meet that challenge. Five starting assumptions are laid out and briefly explained: 1) that scientific consensus can be accepted on anthropogenic climate change; 2) that climate change will impose serious suffering, by depriving individuals of fundamental human interests or capabilities; 3) the no-harm principle; 3) the principle of beneficence (weak and moderate versions); 5) that these two moral principles can be reformulated so as to avoid the non-identity problem. The methodology of the book is explained and a potential objection regarding scope is rejected. The structure of the argument is laid out.
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