The book defended the view that a subject's grounds for her beliefs and desires constitute adequate support for her self-attributions of those mental states. A self-attribution of a belief, or a desire, made on the basis of the subject's grounds for that mental state is only justified if the subject usually forms her beliefs and desires in accordance with the grounds that she has for believing and desiring things. What holds our capacity for self-knowledge together, then, is our disposition to form beliefs and desires in accordance with the grounds that we have for those beliefs and desires. But maintaining that disposition is up to us, which brings up a normative dimension of self-knowledge: We are responsible for the fact that our capacity for self-knowledge works correctly by maintaining a synchronicity between our actual beliefs and desires, and the grounds for belief and desire in our possession.
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