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Transparent MindsA Study of Self-Knowledge$
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Jordi Fernández

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199664023

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199664023.001.0001

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Self-Knowledge for Belief

Self-Knowledge for Belief

Chapter:
(p.40) 2 Self-Knowledge for Belief
Source:
Transparent Minds
Author(s):

Jordi Fernández

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199664023.003.0002

This chapter proposes an account of self-knowledge for belief according to which we attribute beliefs to ourselves based on our grounds for those beliefs. It is argued that this ‘bypass’ view explains our privileged access to our beliefs, and it meets many, though not all, of the conditions which we would expect a successful theory of self-knowledge to meet. The bypass view explains, for example, the transparency of belief, and it makes sense of the idea that we have good reasons for our self-attributions of beliefs even though such self-attributions may turn out to be wrong. The main outcome of the chapter is that some of our mental states play a sort of double duty from an epistemic point of view: They constitute our grounds for our beliefs as well as our reasons for self-attributing those beliefs. The second part of the chapter defends this idea from several compelling objections.

Keywords:   self-knowledge, belief, bypass, grounds, reasons, privileged access, transparency, double duty

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