The Epistemology of Thought-Experiment Judgments
The Epistemology of Thought-Experiment Judgments
This chapter applies the framework developed in Part I in order to explain how thought-experiment judgments can qualify as a priori knowledge. It is suggested that because the contents of thought-experiment judgments are, in many cases, rational necessities, it is possible to know these contents a priori by exhibiting the rational abilities and competencies that enable a subject to have propositional attitudes. It is illuminated how standard philosophical inquiry can have an abductive flavor even if it is a priori. It is also shown that standard philosophical inquiry is continuous with good inquiry considered more broadly. Finally, it is suggested that, to the extent that standard philosophical inquiry is “conceptual analysis”, conceptual analysis is not literally to be understood as the analysis of concepts. The target of standard philosophical inquiry is features of the world, rather than features of concepts per se.
Keywords: thought-experiments, a priori, rational abilities, rational competencies, propositional attitudes, conceptual analysis, concepts
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.
To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .
